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NOTES
TE CONSTITUT[ONALITY OF REIENT/
NON-RESIDENT TUITION DIFERENTIALS
A. Introduction
A fact which must be faced by most persons who plan to
attend a state institution of higher learning outside of their
home state is that, as a non-resident of the state where the
institution is located, they will have to pay higher tuition fees
than will a resident of that state. Depending on the institu-
tion selected, the non-resident student will be required to pay
from one and one quarter to more than three times the tuition
charged a resident student attending the same institution.'
This differential can and often does exceed $1,000 per aca-
demic year, and when coupled with the increasing awareness
and demands of college age students for their constitutional
rights, it is not surprising that the right of state institutions
of higher learning to discriminate against non-resident stu-
dents in this regard has come under increasing attack in the
courts during the last twelve years.
2
The majority of the attacks on the right of a state to
charge non-resident students higher tuition fees have been
based on general allegations of violations of the equal protec-
tion, due process, commerce, or privileges and immunities
clauses of the federal constitution.3 However, since the Su-
preme Court decision in Shapiro v. Thompson,4 the attacks
1. See, e.g., Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence 1970-1971 Bulletin, State
University of New York at Buffalo, p. 54; and College of Law Bulletin 1971-
72, University of Kentucky, p. 15.
2. With the exception of the isolated case of Bryan v. Regents of Univer-
sity of California, 188 Cal. 559, 205 P. 1071 (1922), all cases in this area have
arisen since 1960 commencing with the case of Nezmian v. Graham, 82 Ida. 90,
349 P.2d 716 (1960).
3. See Kirk v. Board of Regents of the University of California, 273 Cal.
App. 2d 463, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 554 (1970) ;
Johns v. Redeker, 406 F.2d 878 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 853
(1970) ; Clarke v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Iowa 1966) ; Landwehr v.
Regents of Univ. of Colo., 156 Colo. 1, 396 P.2d 451 (1964).
4. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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have focused on the specific allegation that durational resi-
dency requirements for qualification for classification as a
resident for tuition purposes constitutes an invidious discrimi-
nation in violation of the equal protection clause. 5 This con-
tention was first raised in the very first case to attack the
resident/non-resident tuition differential, Bryan v. Regents
of University of California,6 although in that case the attack
was based on the privileges and immunities clauses of the
Constitution of the State of California7 rather than on the
United States Constitution.
To date, all attacks on the right of a state to prescribe
higher tuition for a non-resident have failed. In fact the only
reported success in this area occurred in the case of Newman
v. Graham.8 There, a regulation of the Idaho State Board of
Education, which provided that any person properly classified
as a non-resident student retained that status throughout his
continuous regular term attendance at an institution of higher
learning, was declared to be arbitrary, capricious, and unrea-
sonable. The basis of this holding was that the regulation did
not afford any opportunity to show a change of residential or
domiciliary status, and therefore denied equality of oppor-
tunity to persons similarly situated.9
It is in this area of reasonableness of the classification or
reclassification of students as residents for purposes of tui-
tion that further litigation may be expected. This stems at
least in part from the lack of standards or guidelines for de-
termining residency .at many institutions of higher learning
and in part from the often arbitrary and conflicting standards
at the several institutions of higher learning within the same
state. South Carolina, until the commencement of the 1971-72
academic year when a statewide standard of residency for tui-
tion purposes was established,'1 presented a prime example of
the latter situation. Until that time, each of the state institu-
5. Starnes v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (1970), affd mem., 91 S. Ct.
1231 (1971) ; Kirk v. Bd. of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d 463, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260
(1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 554 (1970).
6. 188 Cal. 559, 205 P. 1071 (1922).
7. Id. at 560, 205 P. at 1071.
8. 82 Idaho 90, 349 P.2d 716 (1960).
9. Id. at 95, 349 P.2d 719.
10. 57 S.C. STAT. AT LG. 711 (1971).
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tions of higher learning established their own procedures and
guidelines." The degree of specificity of these standards
varied widely, ranging from several sentences' 2 to three
pages. 13 At the other extreme is the State of California which
in the California Education Code provides minutely detailed
standards for determining residence for purposes of tuition
at state institutions of higher learning.1
4
As has been previously noted, to date the right of the
states to charge a higher non-resident tuition fee has been
regularly upheld by the courts, and the recent Supreme Court
decision in Starns v. Malkerson upheld the validity of a dura-
tional residency requirement for establishing residency for
purposes of tuition. The remainder of this note will be de-
voted to an examination of the development of case law in the
resident/non-resident tuition area and the proposal of guide-
lines and procedures for the classification of students as resi-
dents or non-residents for tuition purposes.
B. Examination of Cases
The first case in which the right of a state to classify
citizens as resident or non-resident for the purpose of determ-
ining tuition fees was the California case of Bryan v. Regents
of University of California& 5 in 1922. Challenged here was a
state statute requiring non-resident students to pay a tuition
fee, (not required of residents), and which defined a non-resi-
dent student as one who had not been a bona fide resident of
California for more than one year preceding his entrance into
the university.1 6 The challenge was on the basis that it vio-
lated the privileges and immunities clauses of the California
Constitution, in that there was no reasonable basis for the
classification of students as non-resident for tuition purposes.
Having noted that it has been conceded that the legislature had
the power to enact laws classifying citizens where the classifi-
cation was not unreasonable and arbitrary, the court analo-
11. See, e.g., WINTHROP COLLEGE, BULL. 1968 at 27; CLEMSON U. AN-
NOuNCEmENT, 1970-71 at 60; THE CITADEL, CATA.LOGtE, 1970-71 at 67; U. OF
S.C, BULL., at A.-31.
12. See THE CITADEL, CATALOGUE, 1970-71 at 67.
13. See CLEMSON U., ANNOUNCEMENT, 1970-71 at 60.
14. WrST's ANN. CAL. EDUC. §§ 23051 to 23059 (West 1969).
15. 188 Cal. 559, 205 P. 1071 (1922).
16. Id. at 560, 205 P. at 1071.
[Vol. 24
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gized the residency requirement for free tuition to the resi-
dency requirement for voting. Stating that it could find no
good reason why the legislature could not make a similar
classification for attending a state university tuition free,
17
the court, in finding the statute not to be unreasonable or ar-
bitrary concluded:
Taxes are payable annually and the requirement that a student shall
maintain a residence in the state of California during one taxation
period as an evidence of the bona fides of his intention to remain a
permanent resident of the state and that he is not temporarily residing
within the state for the mere purpose of securing the advantages of
the university, cannot be held to be an unreasonable exercise of discre-
tion by the legislature or by the respondent.1 8
For the next thirty-eight years there were no further
challenges to the resident/non-resident tuition differential.
Then in 1960 the Idaho case of Newman v. Graham'0 reopened
the attack.
The attack in Newman was a two pronged effort. The
first challenge was directed at the right or power of the legis-
lature to delegate to the Board of Trustees the right to estab-
lish residence requirements, and secondly, a direct attack on
the regulation as being arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable,
and unconstitutional.
20
The code section challenged in the first part of the attack
was I.C. § 33-3008 which provided:
"Rules for admission of students.-The board of trustees shall ordain
such rules and regulations for the admission of students to said Idaho
State College as it shall deem necessary and proper. Students from
other states, territories and countries may be admitted to all the privi-
leges of said College upon paying such reasonable tuition fees as the
trustees may prescribe."
2 1
Although this issue was dropped by the plaintiff/respon-
dent on oral argument, the court held that the legislature not
having made provisions in this area, and having delegated such
powers to the Board of Trustees, the ".... rules and regulations
[of the Board] are of the same force as would be a like enact-
17. Id. at 561, 205 P. at 1071.
18. Id. at 561-62, 205 P. at 1072.
19. 82 Idaho 90, 349 P.2d 716 (1960).
20. Id. at 93, 349 P.2d at 717.
21. Id. at 93, 94, 349 P2d at 718.
Nom~s1972]
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ment of the Legislature, and its official interpretation placed
upon the rule so enacted becomes a part of the rule.
'22
As a general rule, resident/non-resident tuition differen-
tials are prescribed by statute. They may take the form of
specific amounts prescribed by the legislative authorization for
the board of trustees of the respective institutions to set tui-
tion fees as in Newman, either with or without a further pro-
vision that non-resident students may or shall be charged
higher fees. In South Carolina, a combination of these two
approaches is followed. Section 22-22 of the South Carolina
Code provides that tuition fees are to be prescribed by the
boards of trustees of the various state institutions, subject to
the approval of the Budget and Control Board, and specifically
permits higher tuition fees for non-residents of South Caro-
lina.23 This provision is further limited in the grant of powers
to the boards of trustees of the various institutions by the
provision that the fees and other charges established by the
trustees may not be ". . inconsistent with statutes where the
legislature undertakes to fix such fees and charges. ' 24 The
South Carolina Legislature has in fact undertaken to fix such
fees in the annual appropriations bills by either a specific
statement of fees for resident and non-resident students25 or
by a provision that the fees shall be not less than the tuition
for the prior academic year.
26
The second and major part of the attack in Newman was
on a regulation of the Board of Trustees which provided in
part, "*- ' * Any person who is properly classified as a non-
resident student retains that status throughout continuous
22. Id. at 95, 349 P.2d at 718 (citations omitted).
23. S. C. CODE ANN. § 22-22 (Supp. 1970) provides:
Tuition fees (as such term is defined in § 22-23) shall be required to be
paid in such amount or amounts and under such conditions as the respective
boards of trustees of such State institutions shall prescribe, with the approval
of the State Budget and Control Board, hereafter in this chapter referred to
as the "State Board." The provisions of this section shall not be construed as
requiring uniformity of tuition fees at such State institutions nor shall they
preclude a higher scale for nonresidents of South Carolina.
24. See, e.g., S. C. CODE ANN. § 22-104(9) (Supp. 1970).
25. See, e.g., 54 S. C. STAT. AT LG. 441 (1965) ; and 47 S. C. STAT. AT LG.
1837 (1952).
26. See, e.g., 56 S.C. STAT. AT LG. 2253 (1970).
[Vol. 24
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regular term attendance at any institution of higher learning
in. Idaho.' ' 27 It was stipulated by both parties that the plain-
tiff/respondent had been properly classified as a non-resident
student at the commencement of the 1957-58 school year, and
that since September 1957 he had complied with all require-
ments for the establishment of residence in the state of Idaho
for all purposes except to qualify as a resident student under
the challenged regulations. It was further stipulated that the
plaintiff had protested the assessment of non-resident tuition
upon registering for his second school year and that the Board
of trustees had disallowed his protest by reason of the regula-
tion quoted above, and had ruled that he retained his non-resi-
dent status throughout continuous regular term attendance at
Idaho State College .
2
In considering the validity of this regulation, the court
noted that under the interpretation of the regulation by the
Board of Trustees, no opportunity was afforded the plaintiff
to show a change of residential or domiciliary status, and that
such denial in effect denied equality of opportunity to persons
similarly situated, and for that reason the regulation was ar-
bitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.2 9 The court was care-
ful to point out, however, that:
The authority of the Board, through its authorized agency or represen-
tative, to inquire into and ascertain an applicant's residential or dom-
iciliary status is unquestioned. It is the denial to the applicant of an
opportunity to be heard in the matter, within a reasonable time, that
constitutes the objectionable feature of the regulation here considered.30
It should be noted here that in neither the Bryan case nor
the Newman case was the question of the equal protection
clause of the federal Constitution even considered, much less
relied on. This question was first raised in the case of Land-
wehr v. Regents of University of Colorado,31 and while the
question was raised, the opinion of the court does little to shed
any light on the subject. From the facts as set forth in the re-
port of the case, the basis of the plaintiff's claim to resident
status is impossible to determine other than his allegation of
27. 82 Idaho 90, 92, 349 P2d 716, 717 (1960).
28. Id. at 92, 93, 349 P.2d at 717.
29. Id. at 95, 349 P.2d at 719.
30. Id. (emphasis added).
31. 156 Colo. 1, 396 P.2d 451.
19721 NoTms 403
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continuous residence in the state for approximately four
years.8 2 The heart of the complaint however was that the
statute under which he was classified as an out-of-state stu-
dent was unconstitutional in that it violated the equal protec-
tion and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment, the
commerce clause, and the privileges and immunities clause of
the United States Constitution. 33
The statute in question, after setting forth the legislative
intent and defining "in-state student" and "domicile," 34 sets
forth the following presumptions to be used in the determina-
tion of status:
Section 3.-Presumptions and rules for determination of status. * * *
(2) (a) To aid the institutions in deciding whether a student, or
parent, or guardian of the person of a student, is domiciled in Colorado
the following rules shall be applied: * * *
(3) An unemancipated minor shall qualify for a change in status only
if his parents or legal guardian or person having legal custody shall
have completed the requirements for establishing domicile as defined
in this article. An emancipated minor or adult student who has reg-
istered for more than five hours per term shall not qualify for a change
in his classification for tuition purposes unless he shall have com-
pleted twelve continuous months of residence while not attending an
institution of hkqher learning in the state or while serving in the armed
forces.35
The court in considering the plaintiff's constitutional
arguments, which are merely catalogued in the report of the
case, stated that these arguments could be sustained only if
the distinction between in-state and out-of-state students,
... amounts to an unreasonable and arbitrary classification of residents
of Colorado, for which there is no substantial difference and which has
no reasonable relation to the object with which the statute deals nor
to the public purpose sought to be achieved by the legislative enact-
ment.
3 6
After citing several cases in support of this statement,
the court, in upholding the statute as constitutional, merely
held that the classification was not arbitrary or unreasonable
and was not so lacking in a foundation as to contravene the
32. Id.
33. 156 Colo. at 4, 5, 396 P.2d at 452.
34. Id. at 3, 396 P.2d at 452.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 5, 396 P.2d. at 453.
[Vol. 24
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1972]
constitutional principals upon which the plaintiff had relied. 37
Unfortunately, the court failed to set forth any of the reasons
for its holding.
The case of Clarke v. Redeker 38 presents the first detailed
consideration of equal protection arguments in this line of
cases. While the broad question considered by the court was
whether the classification of students as residents or non-resi-
dents for the purpose of paying tuition was violative of the
command of the fourteenth amendment that a state may not
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the law, the focus of the arguments in this case was on the
following provision of the regulations of the State University
of Iowa:
A student from another state who has enrolled for a full program, or
substantially a full program, in any type of educational institution will
be presumed to be in Iowa primarily for educational purposes, and will
be considered not to have established residence in Iowa. Continued
residence in Iowa during vacation periods or occasional periods of
interruption to the course of study does not of itself overcome the
presumption.
3 9
In his argument to the court the plaintiff relied heavily
on the United State Supreme Court decision in Carrington v.
Rash.40 In that case, the Court had held that while the State
of Texas had unquestioned power to impose reasonable resi-
dence restrictions on the right to vote, a provision of the
Texas Constitution which amounted to an absolute denial to
military personnel of the right to vote in Texas, if they first
established their residence in Texas while a member of the
Armed Services, constituted an invidious discrimination in
violation of the equal protection clause in that they were de-
nied the opportunity of ever controverting the presumption of
non-residence. The court distinguished the Iowa tuition regu-
lation from Carrington on the basis of the great emphasis
which the Supreme Court had placed on the absoluteness of
the Texas rule.41 The court here noted that while a student
from another state was presumed to be in Iowa primarily for
37. Id.
38. 259 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
39. Id. at 122.
40. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
41. 259 F. Supp. at 122.
NoTs
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educational purposes, there was nothing in the regulations
which would prevent his reclassification as a, resident in ap-
propriate circumstances. An examination of the regulations
set forth by the court in this case discloses the following perti-
nent provisions which support this finding:
A resident student 21 years of age or over is (1) one whose parents
were residents of the state at the time he reached his majority and who
has not acquired a domicile in another state or (2) who, while an adult,
has established a bona fide residence in the state of Iowa by residing
in the state for at least 12 consecutive months immediately preceding
registration. Bona fide residence in Iowa means that the student is not
in the state primarily to attend college; that he is in the state for pur-
poses other than to attempt to qualify for residence status.
* *~ * * * * * * * * * *
Any nonresident student who reaches the age of 21 years while a stu-
dent at any school or college does not by virtue of such fact attain
residence in this state for admission or tuition payment purposes.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Ownership of property in Iowa or the payment of Iowa taxes, does not
in itself establish residence.
, * • • • • * • * • , •
Continued residence in Iowa during vacation period or occasional
periods of interruption to the course of study does not of itself over-
come the presumption.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
The decision of the Registrar on the residence of a student for admis-
sion, fee, and tuition purposes may be appealed to a Review Committee.
The finding of the Review Committee shall be final.
42
During the trial, the Registrar of the University testified
to the effect that, as far as his office was concerned, a full
time student classified as a non-resident retained that classi-
fication throughout his enrollment. The court noted that the
Registrar's interpretation, standing alone would probably
constitute a constitutional violation on the basis of the holding
in Carrington. However, the existence of a procedure for the
review of the Registrar's decisions and the Review Commit-
tee's interpretation of the rules as permitting a change of
classification under appropriate circumstances persuaded the
court that the presumption of non-residency was a rebuttable
one.43
42. Id. at 121-22 (emphasis added)
43. Id. at 121.
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Having determined that the regulations in question -were
not palpably arbitrary or unreasonable, the court next con-
sidered the question of whether the regulations had a rational
relation to a valid state interest. The court in a brief opinion
accepted the defendant's justification of the discrimination
between resident and non-resident students which was pri-
marily based on the fact that resident students or their parents
paid taxes to the state of Iowa. The court in its holding stated:
The higher tuition charged nonresident students tends to distribute
more evenly the cost of operating and supporting SUI between resi-
dents and nonresidents attending the University. Although there is no
way for this Court to determine the degree to which the higher tuition
charge equalized the educational cost of residents and nonresidents,
it appears to be a reasonable attempt to achieve a partial cost equali-
zation. The regulation classifying students as residents or nonresi-
dents for tuition payment purposes is not arbitrary or unreasonable
and bears a rational relation to Iowa's object and purpose of financing,
operating and maintaining its educational institutions.
4 4
In addition to the attack on the basic validity of the resident/
non-resident classification for tuition purposes, the plaintiff
also alleged that the regulations of State University of Iowa
constituted an unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of
his sex.45 It was the plaintiff's contention that the regula-
tions46 permitted a non-resident female student to change her
classification by marrying a resident of Iowa, but that a non-
resident male student did not have the same opportunity. In
holding that the pertinent regulation did not constitute a con-
stitutional violation, the court observed that while the regula-
tion was an obvious attempt to adhere to the well established
legal concept that the domicile of the wife is the same as that
44. Id. at 123, cited with approval in Johns v. Redeker, 406 F.2d 878, 883
(8th Cir., 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 853 (1970). This statement was also
closely paraphrased in Kirk v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Calif., 273 Cal. App.
2d 463, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial
federal question, 396 U.S. 554 (1970).
45. 259 F. Supp. at 120.
46. The regulation upon which the court relied reads as follows:
The residence of a wife is that of her husband. A nonresident
female student may attain residence through marriage and cor-
respondingly, a resident female student may lose residence by
marrying a nonresident. Proof of marriage should be furnished
to the Registrar at the time change of status is requested.
259 F. Supp. at 124. (emphasis added).
1972] NOTES 407
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of her husband, classification under this regulation was not
automatic and the regulation was merely a guideline for pur-
poses of classification. Finding it reasonable to classify the
husband and wife as residents of the same state, the court
stated that it did not necessarily follow that they had to be
classified as residents of the state where the husband was a
resident prior to the marriage.7 The court apparently placed
considerable weight on the fact that the regulation was not ex-
pressed in absolute terms.4 8 Noting that the regulations did
not contain similar guidelines for male students, the court ob-
served that this did not prevent the appropriate university of-
ficials from considering such a marriage as a factor when the
student was attempting to overcome the rebuttable presump-
tion of non-residency.
The plaintiff in this case further contended that he was a
resident of Iowa for tuition purposes and had been improperly
classified as a non-resident.49 Noting that "[iun reviewing a
determination of an administrative body a court is normally
limited to ascertaining whether the administrative action was
arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious, or unlawful," 50 the
court observed that while the regulations were not unlawful,
and the interpretation of them by the Review Committee was
correct, its application of them appeared unduly rigid. Stat-
ing that the plaintiff, in the view of the court, had established
a substantial basis for being reclassified as a resident for pur-
poses of tuition, the court remanded the case to the Review
Committee for reconsideration. 5'
In a second action, the plaintiff in the above action 52
brought suit seeking damages for being charged non-resident
tuition from August, 1964 to 1967. The trial court dismissed
in a memorandum decision on the grounds that the cause of
action was barred on the grounds of res judicata.5-3 On ap-
peal, 4 the circuit court affirmed the dismissal and stated:
47. 259 F. Supp. at 124.
48. See note 47 mtpra.
49. 259 F. Supp. at 124.
50. Id. (citations omitted).
51. 259 F. Supp. at 125.
52. Clarke v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Iowa 1966) (hereinafter
referred to as the first Clarke case).
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The trial court in its well reasoned opinion has convincingly demon-
strated that plaintiff's present cause of action is barred by res judicata.
In Clarke v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117, an action by the same Regents,
the court determined that charging Clarke the higher nonresident
tuition rate prior to his acquisition of residence in Iowa violated none
of plaintiff's constitutional rights and that plaintiff acquired residence
status for tuition purposes as of September 1966.
As previously stated, federal jurisdiction is based solely on 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1343. The first Clarke case conclusively determines that no substan-
tial federal question is presented by plaintiff's attack on the constitu-
tionality of the Regents' nonresident tuition regulations. See Johns v.
Redeker, 8 Cir., 406 F.2d 878, filed this day.55
The Johns case 50 referred to in the above quote, arose on
appeal from an order of the trial court refusing to convene a
three-judge court on the ground that no substantial federal
question was presented and dismissing the case for want of
jurisdiction, jurisdiction being based exclusively on 28
U.S.C.A. §1343.57 The circuit court observed that the ultimate
issue presented here was "whether any federal guaranteed
constitutional rights of the plaintiffs are violated by charging
nonresident students a higher tuition than is charged residents
of Iowa", 58 and that precisely this issue was raised and de-
cided in the first Clarke case. The court further observed that
while the plaintiff in this case was different, all of the other
parties and the plaintiff's counsel were the same. 59 In affirm-
ing the action of the lower court, the court elaborated some-
what on the holding in the first Clarke case that the resident/
non-resident tuition differential had a rational relation to a
valid state interest when it stated:
Moreover, it is the view of this court that reliance by the trial court on
its decision in the first Clarke case was not misplaced. A substantial
portion of the funds needed to operate the Regents' schools are pro-
vided by legislative appropriation of funds raised by taxation of Iowa
residents and property. Nonresidents and their families generally
make no similar contribution to the support of the schools. A rea-
sonable additional tuition charge against nonresident students which
55. Id. at 885 (emphasis added).
56. Johns v. Redeker, 406 F2d 878 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
853 (1970).
57. Id. at 879.
58. Id. at 880.
59. Id. at 881. The District Judge who heard and dismissed the Johns
case had been one of three judges who heard the first Clarke case, and has in
fact written the opinion in that case.
19721
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tends to make the tuition charged more nearly approximate the cost
per pupil of the operation of the schools does not constitute an un-
reasonable and arbitrary classification violative of the equal pro-
tection [clause] [sic].6o
The Johns case was decided on February 14, 1969.61 On
April 21, 1969, the United States Supreme Court handed down
its decision in the landmark case of Shapiro v. Thompson
612
in which it declared unconstitutional state and District of Co-
lumbia statutory provisions which denied welfare assistance
to residents who had not resided within their jurisdiction for
at least one year immediately preceding their application for
assistance. The court held, inter alia, that such statutory pro-
visions created a classification which constituted an invidious
discrimination which denied the equal protection of the laws to
persons who had been residents for less than one year,63 and
that
[s]ince the classification here touches on the fundamental right of in-
terstate movement, its constitutionality must be judged by the stricter
standard of whether it promotes a compelling state interest. Under
this standard, the waiting-period requirement clearly violates the Equal
Protection Clause.
64
This holding opened a new route to attack the constitutionality
of the resident/non-resident tuition differential,6 5 and such
attacks were not long in coming. Just over one month later
the California Court of Appeals, First District, handed down
its decision in the case of Kirk v. Board of Regents of the Uni-
60. 406 F.2d at 883.
61. Id. at 878.
62. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
63. Id. at 627.
64. Id. at 638. The court however attached the following footnote to its
pronouncement:
We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence
requirements determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuition-
free education, to obtain a license to practice a profession, to hunt
or fish, and so forth. Such requirements may promote compelling
state interests on the one hand, or, on the other, may not be pen-
alties upon the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate
travel.
65. For an article on resident/non-resident tuition differentials, more no-
table for its crusading fervor than for its accuracy or rational treatment of the
subject, see Comment, Nonresident Tuition Charged By State Universities in
review, 38 UMKC L. REv. 341 (1970).
13
Legare: The Constitutionality of Resident/Non-Resident Tuition Differenti
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
NoTEs
versity of California66 whereby it continued the line of cases
upholding the rights of the states to differentiate between resi-
dent and non-resident students for tuition purposes, but this
time in full light of the Shapiro case.
The Kirk case was a direct attack on the validity of the
California twelve (12) month durational residency require-
ment. 67 The plaintiff, Deborah D. Kirk, was the wife of a
California resident whom she married in July of 1967. In
September, 1967, she enrolled as a student at the University of
California where she was classified as a non-resident student
and required to pay the non-resident tuition rate which was
$324 per quarter higher than was the tuition charged "resi-
dent" students.6 8 After first disposing of the plaintiff's con-
tention that as the wife of a California resident, she, like a
minor child whose residence is derivative, should be allowed
for purposes of tuition to take advantage of her husband's
period of residence prior to her marriage,6 9 the court turned
to the main issue of the case; i.e. the constitutionality of the
one year durational residence requirement.
The main contention here was that the one year dura-
tional residency requirement was an unconstitutional infring-
ment of the plaintiff's fundamental constitutional right of
travel, and that this was a clear violation of the equal protec-
tion clause not justified by c compelling governmental in-
terest. It was also contended that the requirement was un-
constitutionally vague and uncertain.70 The plaintiff argued
66. 273 Cal. App. 2d 463, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969), app. dismissed for
want of a substantial federal question, 396 U.S. 554 (1970).
67. The California code defines a resident student as ". . . any person who
has been a bona fide resident of the State for more than one year immediately
preceding the opening day of a semester during which he proposes to attend the
university." WEsT's ANN. CAL. EDuc. CODE § 23054 (West 1969).
68. 78 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
69. The court, while agreeing that the plaintiff became a resident of Cali-
fornia on the date of her marriage despite the fact that she was not physically
present in the state at the time, concluded that it did not logically follow that
for tuition purposes she should be allowed to retroactively take advantage of
her husband's residency. Noting that it could find no authority that permitted
retroactive "tacking" of the husband's period of residence prior to the mar-
riage, the court held that she had not met the one year bona fide residence re-
quirement at the time she enrolled. Id. at 263-64.
70. 78 Cal. Rptr. at 265. .
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that all of the above contentions had been conclusively de-
termined in her favor in the Shapiro case and apparently re-
lied heavily on the following passage from that decision:
We conclude therefore that appellants in these cases do not use and
have no need to use the one-year requirement for the governmental
purposes suggested. Thus, even under traditional equal protection
tests a classification of welfare applicants according to whether they
have lived in the State for one year would seem irrational and un-
constitutional. But, of course, the.traditional criteria do not apply in
these cases. Since the classification here touches on the fundamental
right of interstate movement, its constitutionality must be judged by
the stricter standard of whether it promotes a compelling state interest.
Under this standard, the waiting-period requirement clearly violates the
Equal Protection Clause.
71
Observing that were this the only language in the opinion,
it would have to agree that the one year durational require-
ment constituted an unconstitutional interference with the
plaintiff's right to travel,7 2 the court attached great signifi-
cance to footnote 21 which the Court appended to the above
quoted language.7 3 Believing this footnote not to be an "idle
act", but an indication that the Court did not necessarily in-
tend to apply the same standards to other residence require-
ments such as tuition differentials in institutions of higher
learning,74 the court next examined the potential "chilling ef-
fect" of the regulations on the fundamental constitutional
right of interstate travel. Finding it absurd to contend that a
person contemplating marriage and interstate change of resi-
dence would take into consideration the fact that they would
have to pay a higher non-resident tuition fee of one year if
they intended to continue their higher education at a state sup-
ported institution, the court concluded that the regulation did
not deter any appreciable number of people from marrying
California residents or moving into the state.7 5 In concluding
that the California residence requirement did not infringe on
71. Id., quoting from 394 U.S. at 638.
72. 78 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
73. See note 65 supra.
74. 78 Cal. Rptr. at 266.
75. Id. at 266, where the court stated:
"A restatement of this argument in another way indicates how farfetched
and unreasonable it is. Thus, it seems absurd to contend that a person would
marry a resident of this state in order to obtain one year of higher education at
a lower cost. (emphasis added).
[Vol. 24
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the plaintiff's fundamental right to travel, and that it should
therefore be judged by ordinary equal protection standards,
76
the court distinguished Shapiro as follows:
While we fully recognize the value of higher education, we cannot
equate its attainment with food, clothing and shelter. Shapiro involved
the immediate and pressing need for preservation of life and health of
persons unable to live without public assistance, and their dependent
children. Thus, the residence requirements in Shapiro could cause
great suffering and even loss of life. The durational residence re-
quireinent for attendance at publicly financed institutions of higher
learning do not involve similar risks. Nor was petitioner (unlike the
families in Shapiro) precluded from the benefit of obtaining higher
education. Charging higher tuition fees to nonresident students can-
not be equated with granting of basic subsistence to one class of needy
residents while denying it to an equally needy class of residents.
77
Having concluded that the traditional equal protection
standards should be applied in judging the constitutionality of
the duration residency requirement, the court distinguished
Newman v. Graham s and Carrington v. Rash7 9 as being ap-
plicable to irrebuttable presumptions of non-residency.8 0 In
its discussion of the holding in the Carrington case the court,
taking note of the statement in Carrington that Texas had un-
questioned power to impose "reasonable" residency restric-
tions on the availability of the ballot, stated:
Similarly it can be argued that the benefit of attending a publicly
financed institution of higher education in this state, is within the
jurisdiction of the state, to be exercised as the state may direct, and
upon such terms as to it may seem proper, provided, of course, no
discrimination is made between individuals in violation of the Constitu-
tion.81
In its consideration of the reasonableness of the regu-
lation, the court noted that the California durational residency
requirement was similar to that considered in the first Clarke
case which it found to be most persuasive.82 Observing that
while a student from another state was presumed to be in
76. 78 Cal. Rptr. at 267.
77. Id. at 266-67 (emphasis added).
78. See note 19 supra and the discussion of this case following note 19.
79. 380 U.S. 89.
80. 78 Cal. Rptr. at 267-68.
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California primarily for educational purposes, the court found
that there was nothing in the regulation which would prevent
reclassification if appropriate facts arose subsequent to the
classification, and concluded that the durational residence re-
quirement, here as in Clarke, was reasonable. 83
Having concluded that the regulation was reasonable, the
court next considered the question of whether the classifica-
tion of the plaintiff as a non-resident was rationally related
to a legitimate state objective. The court adopted verbatim
the conclusions found in the first Clarke case that the higher
tuition charged non-residents tended to more evenly distribute
the cost of operating the university between resident and non-
resident students.8 4 Then expanding somewhat on the ration-
ale of the Clarke holding the court stated:
Although there is no way for this court to determine the degree to
which the higher tuition charge equalizes the educational cost of resi-
dents and nonresidents, it appears to be a reasonable attempt to achieve
a partial cost equalization by collecting lower tuition from those per-
sons who, directly or indirectly, have recently made some contribu-
tion to the economy of the state through having been employed, having
paid taxes, or having spent money in the state for the brief period of
one year prior to their attendance at a publicly financed institution of
higher education.8 5
While recognizing that Shapiro specifically rejected the pay-
ment of taxes, fiscal integrity and budgetary planning as
either "traditional equal protection tests" or "compelling state
interests", the court concluded that this rejection was limited
to cases like Shapiro involving benefits essential to life and
health as opposed to attendance at a state institution of higher
learning 06 Finding that California had a valid interest in pro-
viding tuition-free education "to those who have demonstrated
by a year's residence a bona fide intention of remaining here
and who, by reason of that education, will be prepared to make
a greater contribution to the state's economy and future",
8 7
and that the one year residency requirement was not constitu-
tionally 'vague or uncertain, this court, as had the others be-
83. Id. at 269.
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fore it, upheld the right of a state to differentiate between
resident and non-resident students for purposes of tuition.
In March of 1971, the United States Supreme Court gave
its blessings to the right of a state to charge non-resident stu-
dents higher tuition than resident students, and to use dura-
tional residence requirements, when it affirmed the judgment
of a three-judge federal court s in the case of Starns v. Malker-
son. 9 The Stcrns case arose out of the classification of the
plaintiffs as non-residents for the 1969-70 school year pur-
suant to a regulation of the Board of Regents of the Univer-
sity of Minnesota which provided in part:
No student is eligible for resident classification in the University, in
college thereof, unless he has been a bona fide domiciliary of the state
for at least a year immediately prior thereto. This requirement does
not prejudice the right of a student admitted on a nonresident basis to
be placed thereafter on a resident basis provided he has acquired a bona
fide domicile of a year's duration within the state. Attendance at the
University neither constitutes nor necessarily precludes the acquisition
of such domicile. For University purposes, a student does not acquire a
domicile in Minnesota until he has been here for at least a year pri-
marily as a permanent resident and not merely as a student; this in-
volves the probability of his remaining in Minnesota beyond his com-
pletion of school. 90
The plaintiffs had moved to Minnesota in June of 1969 with
their husbands who had taken employment there. The plain-
tiffs appealed their classification to the Board of Regents and
were reclassified as resident students, but the effectiveness of
their reclassification was postponed until June, 1970, one year
after their becoming residents of the state. This action was
then commenced, the plaintiffs asserting that their classifica-
tion as non-residents on the basis of the one year durational
residency requirement was unreasonable and violated the equal
protection clause. They further asserted that the one year
waiting period discriminated among persons whose situation
was otherwise identical, solely on the basis of their constitu-
tionally protected right to travel.91
88. Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (1970).
89. 91 S. Ct. 1231 (1971) "Mem."
90. 326 F. Supp. at 235-36 (emphasis added). From the wording of this
regulation it would appear that it had been carefully drawn in an attempt to
avoid the possibility of being held to be arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious
in light of Nezwnan v. Graham.
91. Id. at 236.
1972]
18
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol24/iss3/5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
In its consideration of the plaintiffs' allegations, the court
first noted that the plaintiffs did not challenge the right of the
University to charge non-resident students higher tuition than
that paid by residents, nor did they challenge the right of the
University to use the durational residency test as a rebuttable
presumption of non-residency.9 2 Rather, the court found the
sole issue to be ". . whether it is constitutionally permissible
for a state to create an irrebuttable presumption that any per-
son who has not continuously resided in Minnesota for one
year immediately before his entrance to [sic] the University is
a nonresident for tuition purposes." 93
The plaintiffs here relied on Shapiro in asserting that the
regulations were an infringement upon their fundamental
right of interstate movement, and that the "compelling state
interest" test should therefore be used to determine whether
the equal protection clause had been violated. However the
court found that Shapiro was distinguishable from the present
case in two important respects. First, that while the waiting
period in Shapiro was found to have had ".... as a specific ob-
jective the exclusion from the jurisdiction of the poor who
needed or may need relief, '94 the court could find no state of
facts upon which it could find that the durational residence
requirement for resident tuition purposes had as a specific
objective the exclusion or even the deterrence of out-of-state
students from attending the University. The court based its
opinion on the fact that over ten percent (10%) of the stu-
dents attending the University in 1968 were non-residents,
and concluded that the regulation therefore could not be held
to have an unconstitutional "chilling effect" on the assertion
of the constitutional right to travel.93 Second, that while in
Shapiro the waiting period had the effect of denying the basic
necessities of life to needy residents, there was no evidence in
the present case that the one year waiting period had any dire
effects on non-resident students which could be equated to
92. Id. at 236. The court found that these issues had been raised and de-
cided in Johns v. Redeker, supra. note 57, and Clarke v. Redeker, supra. note
54.
93. Id. at 236-37.
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those in Shapiro.9 6 Finding that the challenged durational
residence requirement did not constitute a penalty imposed
upon the exercise of the constitutional right to travel and that
there was no infringement of a fundamental right, the court
concluded that the "compelling state interest" test was not
applicable here, and that the "traditional" equal protection
standards should be applied in testing the constitutionality of
the regulation.
In considering the challenged regulation in light of the
"traditional" equal protection test the three judge court first
noted that it was undisputed that the regulation economically
discriminated against a class of residents or that it created an
irrebuttable presumption that a resident who had been in the
state for less than one year was a non-resident for tuition pur-
poses.97 After briefly considering various facets of the "tradi-
tional" equal protection test, the court concluded that, in re-
solving the equal protection clause challenge to the regulation,
it should apply the following test set down by the Supreme
Court :98
In the area of economic and social welfare, a State does not violate
the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made
by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some "reasonable
basis," it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classifi-
cation "is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it
results in some inequality." Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U.S. 61, 78, 31 S. Ct. 337, 340, 55 L.Ed. 369. "The problems of
government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require,
rough accommodations-illogical, it may be, and unscientific." Metro-
polis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69-70, 33 S. Ct. 441,
443, 57 L.Ed. 730. "A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if
any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." Mc-
Gowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426, 81 S. Ct. 1101, 1105, 6 L.Ed.2d
393.99
In considering the regulation under the above standard the
court, as had the court in the Kirk case, distinguished Carring-
ton as involving an absolute classification which could not be
rebutted under any circumstances whereas in the present case,
96. Id. at 238. The court stated that it concurred with the reasoning of the
California Court of Appeals in the Kirk case on this point.
97. 236 F. Supp. at 238-39.
98. Id. at 239.
99. 397 U.S. at 485.
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the presumption of non-residence could be overcome, ". . . if
the student provides sufficient evidence to show bona fide
domiciliary [sic] within the State, one element of which is
proof that he had resided within the state for a period of one
year."'' 10  Finding the classification not to be arbitrary or
permanent, the court concluded:
We believe it is reasonable to presume that a person who has not re-
sided within the State for a year is a nonresident student, and that
it is reasonable to require that to rebut this presumption the student
must be a bona fide domiciliary of the State for one year. We find
nothing in Carrington v. Rash, supra, which is inconsistent with this
conclusion.101
Turning next to the final question of whether the classi-
fication was reasonably related to a legitimate state objective,
the court noted that while the defendants advanced several
grounds argued to be valid state objectives, it was enough if
any one of the grounds set forth provided a reasonable justifi-
cation for the regulation.10 2 The court, noting that the primary
ground advanced by the defendants was the same as that ad-
vanced in Kirk and in the first Clarke case, and that charging
non-resident students a higher tuition had been held constitu-
tional in the first Clarke case, stated:
We believe that once the law affords recognition to the right of a
state to discriminate in tuition charges between a resident and non-
resident, that right to discriminate may be applied reasonably to the
end that a person retains a nonresident classification for tuition pur-
poses until he has completed a twelve-month period of domicile within
the State. We believe that the State of Minnesota has the right to say
that those new residents of the State shall make some contribution,
tangible or intangible, towards the State's welfare for a period of twelve
months before becoming entitled to enjoy the same privileges as long-
term residents possess to attend the University at a reduced resident's
fee. Accordingly, we hold that the regulation requiring a one-year
domicile within the State to acquire resident classification for tuition
purposes at the University is constitutionally valid.' 0 3
C. Examination of Cases-Some Conclusions
From the foregoing examination of cases, the right of a
state to charge higher non-resident tuition fees and to use a
100. 326 F. Supp. at 240 (emphasis added).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 240, citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
103. 326 F. Supp. at 241 (emphasis added).
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durational residence requirement as a part of its test of resi-
dency appears to be clearly established as being constitutional.
However, as previously indicated, the regulations themselves
would still appear to be open to attack on the grounds that they
are arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable if they are found
to present an irrebutta ble presumption of non-residency for
purposes of tuition. An example of such a regulation is found
in the 1971-1972 School of Law Bulletin of the University of
Maryland where it is provided:
Definition of Residence and Non-Residence
Students who are minors are considered to be resident students if at
the time of their registration their parents have been domiciled in this
State for at least six months.
The status of the residence of a student is determnined at the time of
his first registration in the University, and may not thereafter be
changed by him unless, in the case of a minor, his parents mhove to and
become legal residents of this State by naintaining such residence for
at least six months. However, the right of the minor student to change
from a non-resident to a resident status must be established by him
prior to the registration period set for any semester.
Adult students are considered to be residents if at the time of their
registration they have been domiciled in this state for at least six
months provided such residence has not been acquired while attend-
ing any school or college in Maryland or elsewhere.
Time spent on active duty in the armed services while stationed in
Maryland will not be considered as satisfying the six-month period
referred to above except in those cases in which the student was dom-
iciled in Maryland for at least six months prior to his entrance into
the armed service and was not enrolled in any school during that
period.
The word domicile as used in this regulation shall mean the perm-
anent place of abode. For the purpose of this rule only one domicile
may be maintained.10 4
Just such a regulation was overthrown in N e w m a n v.
Graham,105 and in the first Clarke case all that saved a similar
regulation was a provision for the review of the decisions of
the Registrar and the fact that the Review Committee inter-
preted the regulations as permitting reclassification. 00 A
point worthy of noting in the above regulation is the provision
104. School of Law, 1971/1972, University of Maryland Bulletin, p. 21
(emphasis added).
105. See text at n. 28-31, supra.
106. See text at n. 44, supra.
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that for purposes of the six months durational residence test,
time spent in attendance at a state institution of higher learn-
ing or while on active duty in the armed services may not be
counted toward satisfying the requirement. While a similar
regulation was upheld in Landwehr, it is doubtful that such a
regulation would stand up under attack today. This statement
is predicated on the view that the Maryland regulation, as
written, establishes an irrebuttable presumption that a stu-
dent, once classified as a non-resident, can never be classified
as a resident so long as he remains a student, even though he
fulfills any and all other requirements for establishing his
domicile in Maryland. The regulation construed in the Starns
case contained no such irrebuttable presumption, and in fact
specifically provided that, "[aittendance at the University
neither constitutes nor necessarily precludes the acquisition of
such a domicile."'1 °7 Clearly, if further litigation is to be
avoided in this area, it is imperative that the boards of regents
of the various state institutions of higher learning or the state
legislatures as the case may be, carefully review their regula-
tions on resident/non-resident tuition and modify them if and
as necessary.
While it is beyond the scope of this note to attempt to set
forth a model regulation concerning resident/non-resident tui-
tion differentials, the model legislation 08 prepared by the
Education Commission of the States, is an extremely well pre-
pared proposal which should stand up against any constitu-
tional attack. The adoption of this model legislation is strongly
recommended, and short of adoption by state legislatures, its
adoption in slightly modified form by the various state insti-
tutions of higher learning is urged as an effective interim
measure.
D. Suggested Classification Guidelines
Assuming that a valid set of regulations are in fact in
existence, what are some appropriate tests which may be ap-
plied in the borderline case to determine whether a student
qualifies for resident tuition? This borderline case is basically
107. 326 F. Supp. at 236.
108. MODEL LEGISLATION ON STUDENT RESIDENCY (Revised 8/25/71),
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confined to the "emancipated person" defined in the proposed
model legislation as ".... a person who has attained the age of
18 years, and whose parents have entirely surrendered the
right to the care, custody, and earnings of such person and
who no longer are under any legal obligation to support or
maintain such person."'
10 9
Before considering the possible tests, a preliminary point
which must be disposed of is the meaning of the term "resi-
dence" which is commonly used in regulations relating to tui-
tion differentials. Unfortunately, laymen, and all too often
even some of the courts, tend to use the terms "residence" and
"domicile" interchangeably, although the two terms have dis-
tinct and quite different meanings. Thus, while even the title
of this note uses the term "resident', it is in fact the "domi-
cile" of the student which is critical to the proper determina-
tion of what rate of tuition the student will be charged.
Domicile is defined as the place where a man has his true,
fixed, and permanent home to which he intends to return
whenever he is absent, as distinguished from his temporary
and transient, though actual, place of residence. 110 More to
the point in issue here is the following definition adopted by
the court in Newman:
A residence is different from a domicile, although it is a matter of
great importance in determining the place of domicile. The essential
distinction between residence and domicile is that the first involves
the intent to leave when the purpose for which one has taken up his
abode ceases. The other has no such intent; the abiding is animus
manendi. One may seek a place for the purpose of pleasure, of busi-
ness or of health. If his intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile;
if his intent be to leave as soon as his purpose is accomplished, it is his
residence."'1
From the foregoing then, it becomes clear that the key to de-
termining whether a student qualifies as a resident student
for purposes of reduced tuition is whether it is his intent to
become a domiciliary of the state. While intent is a purely
subjective matter, there are clearly certain objective criteria
which are indicative of intent, and while it is a simple matter
109. MoDEL LEGISLATION ON STUDENT RsIDENcY § 2 (4) (Revised 8/25/
71).
110. BLAcics LAw DIcTioNARY, 572 (Revised 4th ed. 1968).
111. 82 Idaho at 94, 349 P.2d at 718 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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to state, "I intend to make this my permanent home," this
statement standing alone is valueless for the purpose of es-
tablishing the necessary intent. There must be something
more, some tangible showing to back up the declared intent.
Among those factors which should be considered in de-
termining whether the requisite intent is established are:
(a) employment; (b) whether and where a state income tax re-
turn has been filed; (c) where the student is registered to
vote; (d) where the student's car, if any, is registered; (e)
where the student's driver's license was issued; (f) ownership
of a home; (g) degree of participation in community affairs;
(h) location of religious affiliation if any; and (i) return to the
parental home during periods when classes are not in session.
It must be emphasized, however, that the doing or failure to
do one or more of these tangible acts should not of and by it-
self be considered to be controlling. Any one of them, of itself,
may be equally consistent with either domiciliary or out of
state residence status. What must be shown is a pattern of
activity or inactivity which would be consistent with but one
conclusion.
A brief examination of these factors and their signifi-
cance is perhaps in order.
(1) Employment. While it is clear that full time or even
part time employment is not in itself decisive, and in fact is
not necessarily compatible with obtaining a higher education,
it is indicative of the person's emancipation and of a contri-
bution to the state and to the local community. Not only should
the employment of the student be considered, but that of the
student's spouse as well, for today it is not uncommon for a
married student to be put through school by the efforts of his
or her spouse.
(2)Filing of State Tax Return. This factor is perhaps
one of the more important of the nine listed. While the failure
to file a return in the state where the student is attending
an institution of higher learning is not inconsistent with
domiciliary status if the student is not working, the filing of
such a return in another state would be clearly contraindica-
tive of domiciliary status.
(3) Where Registed to Vote. Here again, while failure to
register to vote in the state where the institution is located is
[V7ol. 24422
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not in itself significant, the fact of registration in another
state would be of considerable significance. This criteria is
subject to some very circular reasoning however, for in some
communities students have not been permitted to register to
vote on the grounds that they were not classified as resident
students at the institution they were attending, while the in-
stitution in turn refused to classify them as resident students
because they were not registered to vote in the state.
(4) Place of Registration of Automobile.
(5) Place of Issuance of Driver's License. Both the regis-
tration of a car and the possession of a valid state drivers li-
cense are relatively good indicators of an intent to be a domi-
ciliary of a state, particularly if the state is one with high fees
for one or both of these activities. Conversely, where a state's
fees are low in relation to other states, this factor tends to lose
importance. Possession of a drivers license issued by another
state and/or registration of a car in another state, however,
might well be considered to be strong indications of an out of
state domicile.
(6) Ownership of Residential Property Within State.
While there are undoubtably few students who own or are buy-
ing their own homes, such ownership would lend weight to the
student's claim to domiciliary status. Conversely, the fact of
non-ownership would carry little or no weight for this determi-
nation. Residence in dormitories provided by the state institu-
tion, which must be vacated when classes are not in session,
would be a strong indicator of non-resident status. The oc-
cupancy of an apartment, whether or not provided by the in-
stitution, should not be considered to lend weight to either
position, especially in view of the fact that it is only natural
to seek adequate accommodation at the lowest possible rent.
(7) Participation in Community Affairs. Although active
participation in community affairs is by no means the exclu-
sive domain of a domiciliary of the state, it is still a factor
which might be considered. Keeping in mind that we are look-
ing for a pattern indicative of intent, a strong showing in this
area would fit such a pattern.
(8) Location of Religious Affiliation. This factor, like
that of active participation in community affairs, is really no-
19721 NoTms
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thing more than supportive of the previous factors, but for a
person with strong religious convictions, the transfer of
church membership would be clearly consistent with an intent
to become a domiciliary of the community where he lives.
(9) Return to the Parental Home. While periodic return
to the parental home is undoubtably the norm in most cases,
what must be considered here is the duration of the stay and
the purpose if determinable. A pattern of return whenever
classes are not in session, and for the full duration of the break
between sessions, would tend to show the retention of the
parental domicile as that of the student and would likewise
be inconsistent with such other factors as employment. While
it might be argued that such activity is merely in the interest
of economy through reduction of living costs, it still remains
that this is not consistent with an intent to establish domicile.
While the above guidelines should prove helpful in deter-
mining whether the requisite intent for establishing domicile
is present, it cannot be overemphasized that they cannot be ap-
plied as a blind, mechanical formula. Each case must be care-
fully considered in light of all of the facts and surrounding
circumstances. While the burden of proof should be upon the
applicant to show that he has in fact become a domiciliary of
the state in which the institution is located, this burden must
not be so great that a court could find the standards to be ar-
bitrary. A formal review board empowered to make a final
determination is absolutely necessary, and so long as it is not
merely a rubber stamp for the decisions of the registrar, the
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